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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent practitioners must balance their clients' needs for cost-effective
representation, uncertainty about a technology's future value, and the
obligations imposed by patent laws. This is especially true for technologies
having developmental and regulatory timelines of a decade or more, such as
pharmaceuticals and medical technologies.' Hundreds of pharmacological
agents can be tested and discarded before one is determined to meet the
regulatory requirements of safety and effectiveness. Meanwhile, the patent-
seeking organization is often a non-profit entity facing extremely tight budget
restrictions. Substantive prosecution may be delayed until funding becomes
available or it is clear that the technology has sufficient value to warrant patent
protection. A risk associated with such a strategy, however, is that prosecution
laches may bar enforcement of the resulting patent.
A recent case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC), Cancer Research Technology, Ltd. v. Barr Laboratories (CRT v. Barr),
clarifies the requirements for showing laches by the defendant.2 This Practice
Point summarizes the current state of the law on prosecution laches in view of
CRT v. Barr and provides guidelines for practitioners needing to balance client
needs with equitable obligations of timely prosecution.
II. PROSECUTION LACHES BEFORE CRT v. BARR
Prosecution laches, in use since 1923 as an equitable defense to a charge of
patent infringement, was revived in 2002 in Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson
Medical (Symbol Technologies 1.3 Symbol Technologies I established the modern
doctrine of prosecution laches as applicable "to bar enforcement of patent
claims that issued after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution
even though the applicant complied with pertinent statutes and rules."4 In re
Bogese JJ,5 extended the doctrine to grant the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) authority to apply prosecution laches to pending
applications. 6 Though these two cases established that prosecution laches is still
an effective defense, the rulings failed to define fully the standard for an
effective claim of prosecution laches, thus presenting challenges for district
courts interpreting these rulings.
I Christopher Adams & Van Brantner, Spending on New Drug Development, 19 HEALTH ECON.
130 (2010).
2 625 F3d 724 (Fed. Cit. 2010) [hereinafter CRT v. Barr].
3 277 F3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Symbol Techs. 1].
4 Id. at 1363.
5 303 F3d 1362 (Fed. Cit. 2002).
6 Id. at 1367-68.
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District courts uniformly have taken the approach that prosecution laches
should be used "sparingly in only the most egregious of cases,"7 such as an
eighteen year delay.8 Most courts agree that relatively short prosecution times
are not sufficient for prosecution laches, such as when patents issue less than
two and a half years from the application date or within seven years from the
earliest priority application.9
The difficulties in applying the standard for prosecution laches lie within the
boundaries marked by the above-described extremes. In the gray areas, courts
continue to employ the defense in moderation, ruling that an eleven year term
between the priority application filing and the patent claim issuance does not
constitute laches without evidence of deliberate or inexcusable delay.10 Courts
have also considered delays associated with the field of the invention when
determining whether to apply the doctrine," holding no prosecution laches
where a fifteen year time gap existed between the first filed application and the
subject patent and where no evidence was presented that this time lapse was
unordinary in the prosecution of a life sciences application. The hesitancy to
apply prosecution laches is further compounded when considering USPTO and
government actions.12
In instances where the patent term is not affected, such as when the patent
is subject to a terminal disclaimer or in certain post-GATT patents, courts tend
not to find prosecution laches even when delays are considerable.' 3
Additionally, the patent owner's actions during prosecution, such as filing
continuation or divisional applications after receiving a notice of allowance or
responding to office actions using full extensions, and after prosecution, such as
seeking a certificate of correction twelve years after issuance, are not normally
grounds for a prosecution laches ruling.14
7 Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. Computer Motion, Inc., 2002 No. Civ. A. 01-203-SLR, WL
31833867 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2002).
8 Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 422 E3d 1378, 1385-86 (2005) [hereinafter Symbol
Tecbs. 11].
9 See Stambler v. RSA Security, Inc., 243 E Supp. 2d 74, 76 (D. Del. 2003).
10 Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., No. 99-CV-2668, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25020, at *118-19
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2002).
11 Centocor Ortho Biotech., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 669 E Supp. 2d 756, 771-72 (E.D.
Tex. 2009).
12 Honeywell Intern. Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 514, 580 (Fed. Cl. 2008), rev'd, 377 Fed.
Appx. 14 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding no prosecution laches after a seventeen year delay when a
portion of the delay was caused by the issuance of a secrecy order).
13 See Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2009);
Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 2d 484 (D. Del. 2009).
14 See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 06-CV-0684-14, 2008 WL 410692 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 12, 2008); Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 529 F Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass.
2007); Kothmann Enterprises, Inc. v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 455 E Supp. 2d 608 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
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III. CRT v. BARR
A. UNDERLYING FACTS
The disputed patent was U.S. Pat. No. 5,260,291 (the '291 patent) covering
an anti-cancer drug called temozolomide.15 The '291 patent issued in
November 1993 from the eleventh application in a chain of continuation
applications claiming priority to a first-filing in the United States in August
1982.16 The first application included the same claims as those that issued in
the '291 patent and was rejected for lacking proof of utility:
Proof of utility under this section [6 08 .01(p)] may be established
by clinical or in vivo or in vitro data, or combinations of these,
which would be convincing to those skilled in the art.... More
particularly, if the utility relied on is directed solely to the
treatment of humans, evidence or utility, if required, must
generally be clinical evidence, although animal tests may be
adequate where the art would accept these as appropriately
correlated with human utility.. . or where animal tests are coupled
with other evidence, including clinical evidence and a structural
similarity to compounds marketed commercially for the same
indicated uses.'7
The response to this rejection was to file a continuation with the same claims.
A same or similar pattern of rejection and response occurred through the sixth
application. The rejection of the seventh application added another ground for
rejection under the best mode requirement and mentioned the lack of in vivo or
in vitro data.'8
On the eleventh continuation (and after ten abandonments), filed on
October 18, 1991, the applicant filed a preliminary amendment with remarks
pointing to the animal data described in the specification. 9 Despite this,
another office action was issued with the same utility rejection but noting that
the "[r]emission of a specific leukemia could be established, but has not been so
accomplished or so claimed." 20 The first substantive response to an office
action was subsequently filed, again citing the specification of the application as
proof of utility. 21
15 CRT v. Barr, 625 F3d 724, 726 (Fed. Cit. 2010).
16 Id.
17 Cancer Research Technology v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 679 F Supp. 2d 560, 565-66 (D. Del.
2010), rev'd, 625 E3d 724 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
18 Id. at 566.
19 Id. at 568.
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In April 1993, a Notice of Allowance was issued with the examiner citing a
publication by one of the inventors as proof of utility.22 The court noted that
the publication did not disclose human data, but showed activity of
mitozolomide and other related compounds against tumors in mice.23 The
patent issued in November 1993 and a new drug application was filed with the
FDA a few days later.24 Human trials were conducted from 2000 to 2004, with
approval for sale of the drug granted in 2005.25 Barr filed its generic drug
application in 2007.26
Commercialization of the invention occurred continuously during
prosecution, including an exclusive license of the invention by CRT to Schering
Plough in June 1992, contemporaneous with CRT's first efforts to respond
substantively to the examiner's rejection.27
B. DISTRICT COURT DECISION
The district court construed the law as requiring a high burden for finding
prosecution laches, but found that burden was met considering the length of
the delay and CRT's lack of efforts to rebut the rejection during the delay until
it benefitted CRT to do so. 28 It noted that the authority cited when a
substantive response was ultimately filed by CRT was from a 1986 Board
decision citing even earlier case law to support its statement that substantiating
evidence may be in the form of animal tests.29 Although the evidence presented
by CRT seemed to indicate CRT's genuine belief that they needed human data
to successfully rebut the Examiner's arguments, the applicable standard is
whether CRT's belief was objectively reasonable. 30
The District Court did recognize that previous decisions addressed the issue
of prejudice to the defendant,3 ' but found prejudice arising from the infringers'
intervening activities during the delay to be only a factor and not a
requirement. 32 "Nowhere in its discussion did the Federal Circuit affirmatively
impose a particular requirement that a competitor have invested in the
technology claimed in order for prosecution laches to apply." 33





27 Id. at 569.
28 Id. at 573.
29 Id
30 Id
31 Id. at 572.
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The CAFC reversed the District Court's decision based on its failure to
recognize that prejudice to the defendant is a requirement for a defense of
prosecution laches.34 Barr, prepared for such an exigency, also presented
arguments that the public is inherently prejudiced if a delay extends a patent
monopoly into the future, thus preventing Barr's earlier entry into the
temozolomide market. 35 The CAFC was unconvinced, however, because of
Barr's four year delay in filing its own generic drug application with the FDA. 36
In addition, the CAFC noted that no other applications for FDA approval were
made when permitted under the FDA's regulations.37
The CAFC also observed that CRT's delay was not without consequence to
CRT because it ran the risk of intervening activity by competitors, even though
no such activity occurred. 38 Also, CRT lost some of its patent term extension
due to its delay.39
[A] consequence of Cancer Research's delay in prosecuting its
patent is that it did not get the full patent term extension allowed
under 35 U.S.C f 156 because of the fourteen-year cap on
exclusivity when a patent has been extended under the Hatch-
Waxman Act. [35 U.S.C.] 5 156(c)(3). Thus, rather than having
consequences for Barr and the public by its delay, Cancer
Research incurred a cost to its own patent term.40
Perhaps the most interesting observation (most likely dicta) of the case was that
prosecution laches should be increasingly rare in the future because the patent
term now runs from filing instead of issuance and term extensions are relatively
limited.41
Circuit Judge Prost dissented from the decision, believing that the case law
did not support a requirement of prejudice. 42 Prost's dissent also differed with
the finding that prejudice must be tied to the period of the delay, writing that
"[s]uch a requirement (1) discounts the relationship between prosecution laches
and broad public interests in the timely issuance of patents and (2) imposes a
novel time restriction on the harm suffered." 43 Instead, Prost felt that the
34 CRT v. Barr, 625 E3d 724, 736 (Fed. Cit. 2010).
3s Id. at 736-37.
36 Id. at 731.
37 Id. at 742.
38 Id. at 743.
39 Id. at 731-32.
4 Id.
41 Id. at 744.
42 Id. at 735 (Prost, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 736.
[Vol. 18:533538
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Supreme Court in its decisions recognized that delaying a patent's monopoly
period harms the public by delaying free use of the invention."
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Although the CAFC decided that prosecution laches requires some type of
prejudice specific to the defendant, caution should be used when following
CRT v. Barr for guidance. The dissent by Judge Prost was well supported and
the Supreme Court is fond of overturning the CAFC when it decides to apply a
bright-line rule in favor of examining the facts and circumstances of each
dispute. 45
For a rare long-pending application still qualifying for a term calculated from
the issue date, it would be safest to apply the lower court's decision as if it were
upheld. Steer clear of situations that would give a foothold to arguments of
prosecution laches. Avoid delays tied to filing non-responsive amendments or
continuations. Do not be overly deferential to examiner rejections, even if they
appear rational on their face or serve the client's interest in delaying
prosecution. Consider the timing of any delays relative to what is happening in
the business world and whether such delays would appear to be offensive to
equitable principles. Delays should be for obtaining protection, such as
developing secondary evidence to overcome an obviousness rejection, not to
gain the upper hand on a competitor. Also, be aware of a competitor's market
readiness. Any excessive delay after the competitor is ready to enter the market
could be construed as prejudicing the defendant.
The risk seems to be very small for the majority of patent applications
having a term based on their filing date because of the dicta in CRT v. Barr and
the decisions on patents subject to terminal disclaimers. The loss of term
ameliorates the concern about prejudice to the general public espoused by
Judge Prost and even, to some extent, eliminates the specific prejudice to a
defendant since expiration of the patent will almost be a time certain. One
exception might be where the applicant's activities serve to induce delay by the
patent office, resulting in patent term adjustment for USPTO delays or patent
term extension.46  For example, filing an application, responses to office
actions, or appeal briefs that are so voluminous as to induce delay past the
applicable deadlines, may result in patent term adjustment. In an instance
where the patent applicant stands to be awarded a lengthy patent term
extension or patent term adjustment, prosecution laches may again become an
issue.
4 Id.
45 See, e.g., Bilski x Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1727 (2007).
46 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(b)-156 (2002).
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V. CONCLUSION
As long as some care is used to avoid appearing to induce delays that result
in patent term extension or adjustment, prosecution laches is unlikely to be a
viable defense to patents with a term calculated from the priority date. For the
rare patent application still pending since the June 8, 1995 deadline and entitled
a term calculated from the issue date, care should be used not to appear to be
delaying prosecution for competitive reasons.
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